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This paper studies a search model of the labor market where ￿rms have private
information about the quality of their vacancies, they can costlessly communicate
with unemployed workers before the beginning of the application process, but the
content of the communication does not constitute a contractual obligation. At
the end of the application process, wages are determined as the outcome of an
alternating o⁄er bargaining game. The model is used to show that vague non-
contractual announcements about compensation￿ such as those one is likely to ￿nd
in help-wanted ads￿ can be correlated with actual wages and can partially direct
the search strategy of workers.
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1 Introduction
The search literature has focused on two polar descriptions of the labor market: random
and directed search. In the random search model￿ as exempli￿ed by McCall (1970) and
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1Mortensen (1970)￿ unemployed workers have no information about the idiosyncratic
component of the wage o⁄ered to ￿ll di⁄erent openings. In order to learn about the
wage for a particular job, an unemployed worker has to make a relationship-speci￿c
investment, i.e. he has to spend some time and money applying for that job. In the
directed search model￿ as exempli￿ed by Montgomery (1991), Moen (1997) or Burdett
Shi and Wright (2001)￿ unemployed workers have perfect information about the di⁄erent
wages o⁄ered for di⁄erent jobs before they decide where to look for work.
In reality, an unemployed worker does not have precise information about wages when
he chooses where to apply for a job. Typically, an advertisement for a job opening only
contains vague and non-contractual statements about compensation such as ￿great career
opportunities,￿￿competitive pay￿or ￿wage commensurate with experience.￿Does this
mean that random search is the relevant model of the labor market? Or could it be
that these vague non-contractual statements are correlated with actual compensation
and partially direct the search strategy of workers?
In order to answer this question, I study a search model of the labor market where
￿rms can communicate with unemployed workers before the application stage, but the
content of communication is not contractually binding. More speci￿cally, I consider
an economy populated by homogeneous workers￿ each looking for a job￿ and heteroge-
neous ￿rms￿ each trying to ￿ll one vacancy. First, after having privately observed its
productivity, each ￿rm chooses which message to use to advertise its opening. Then,
after having observed the entire distribution of help-wanted ads, each worker chooses
where to apply for a job. Finally, if a ￿rm and an applicant successfully match, the
terms of trade are determined as the outcome of an alternating-o⁄er bargaining game.
The main ￿nding of the paper is that￿ unless the labor market is either too tight
or too slack￿ there exists an equilibrium where non-contractual announcements about
compensation are correlated with actual wages and direct the search strategy of workers.
In this equilibrium, the productivity line is partitioned into a ￿nite number of connected
intervals. If the productivity of two jobs falls in the same interval, ￿rms advertise them
with the same message. If the productivity of two jobs belongs to di⁄erent intervals,
￿rms advertise them with di⁄erent messages. In this equilibrium, workers apply more
frequently to those jobs that are advertised with more positive messages about compen-
sation, i.e. messages that come from a more productive set of ￿rms. Conversely, ￿rms
are more likely to ￿ll their vacancies if they post a more positive message. When a
worker and a ￿rm successfully match, they begin to bargain over the terms of trade. At
this stage, the worker￿ s beliefs about the gains from trade are a⁄ected by the type of
2message used by the ￿rm to advertise the job. And the more positive was the message,
the more optimistic is the worker, the higher are his wage demands and, ultimately, the
wage outcome.
How can non-contractual announcements be informative about wages and play a role
in directing the search strategy of workers? The answer provided by this paper is based
on two insights. First, workers apply more frequently to those jobs that are advertised
with more positive messages because they expect to meet more productive ￿rms that, in
turn, are more likely to concede to high wage demands. Secondly, more positive messages
are posted by more productive ￿rms because those are the only ones that are willing to
face tougher wage demands at the bargaining stage in order to ￿ll their openings with
higher probability.
For a partially directed search equilibrium to exist, the labor market must be bal-
anced. Speci￿cally, if there are too many unemployed workers with respect to open
vacancies, the incentives to signal higher productivity are not su¢ ciently strong to make
non-contractual advertisement informative about compensation. Conversely, if there are
too many job openings with respect to unemployed workers, the incentives to signal
high productivity are so strong that non-contractual announcements about compensa-
tion cannot be credible. The precise location of these bounds on labor market tightness
depends in a simple way on the relationship between the worker￿ s bargaining power and
the elasticity of the matching function.
Brief Literature Review In a series of in￿ uential papers, Nelson (1970, 1974) argues
that inherently uninformative advertisement may be useful to consumers if there hap-
pens to be a correlation between a ￿rm￿ s observable advertisement expenditures and the
unobservable quality of its good. In turn, such correlation may exist if producers of high
quality goods have more to bene￿t by attracting new customers than the producers of
low quality goods, for example because of the possibility of repeat purchases. This idea
has been formalized by Milgrom and Roberts (1986). In Bagwell and Ramey (1994),
ostensibly uninformative advertisement is useful to consumers because a store￿ s adver-
tisement expenditures happen to be correlated with the unobservable variety of products
it carries. In turn, the correlation can be sustained in equilibrium because retail stores
that sell more goods have more to bene￿t from attracting new customers. My paper
presents an alternative mechanism through which inherently uninformative advertise-
ment may end up being useful to those who are searching the market. In my paper, the
cost of advertising a high-quality job takes the form of tougher wage demands at the
bargaining stage. And the bene￿t of advertising a high-quality job takes the form of
3higher probability of ￿lling the opening.
Structure of the paper In Section 2, I describe the environment and specify the
equilibrium concept. In Section 3, I ￿rst characterize the outcome of the bargaining
game. Then, I identify a simple set of necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the existence
of an equilibrium in which ￿rms use N di⁄erent messages to advertise their vacancies.
In Section 4, I characterize the equilibrium set of the advertisement game in partial
equilibrium. Finally, is Section 5, I endogenize the value of search and characterize the
equilibrium set of the advertisement game in general equilibrium.
2 Model
2.1 Environment
The economy is populated by a continuum of ￿rms with measure 1 and a continuum of
workers with measure b: Each ￿rm i has one vacant job that would produce yi units of
output if it was ￿lled by a worker. The productivity of the job is privately observed by the
￿rm who owns it. The density f(y) of job productivities is common knowledge. I assume
that the density f(y) is strictly positive over the interval [y;y], where 0 < y < y = 1,
and I denote its cumulative distribution with F(y). Both ￿rms and workers maximize
expected consumption.
The two sides of the market come together via search. At the beginning of the period,
￿rm i privately observes the productivity yi of its job and chooses a message si with which
to advertise it. The set S of messages that the ￿rm can choose from is fs1;s2;:::sKg
where K is some large number.1 Next, each worker reads the help-wanted advertisements
and decides where to apply for a job. That is, worker j seeks jobs advertised with the
message sj, where sj belongs to the set of messages posted by some ￿rms.
Denote with ￿k the ratio of the workers seeking a job advertised with sk to the
number of ￿rms posting that message. Following Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), I refer
to ￿k as the job￿ s queue length. A job with a queue of length ￿ is ￿lled with probability
￿ (￿), where ￿ : [0;1] ! [0;1] is a twice continuously di⁄erentiable function such that
1Even though the analysis carried out in the paper does not directly apply to the case where K = 1,
it is easy to generalize it and show that any equilibrium in which ￿rms use in￿nitely many messages to
advertise their job openings is the limit of a sequence of equilibria where a ￿nite number N of messages
are used, N = 1;2;:::: In this sense, the assumption of a ￿nite (but arbitrarily large) message space is
made without loss in generality.
4￿0(￿) > 0; ￿00(￿) < 0, ￿(0) = 0 and ￿(1) = 1. Symmetrically, if a worker applies to a job
where the queue has length ￿; the worker is hired with probability ￿(￿) = ￿
￿1￿(￿), where
￿ : [0;1] ! [0;1] is a twice continuously di⁄erentiable function such that ￿0(￿) < 0,
￿(0) = ￿ and ￿(1) = 0. Denote with ￿(￿) the elasticity of the job-￿lling probability
￿ (￿) with respect to ￿: I assume that ￿(￿) is a strictly decreasing function such that
￿(0) = 1 and ￿(1) = 0. The reader may ￿nd useful to interpret ￿(￿) as v￿1m(￿v;v);
where m(u;v) is a constant return to scale function that tells how many matches are
created when u workers seek v jobs. Then, the reader should notice that all the standard
matching functions satisfy my assumptions on ￿(￿), ￿(￿) and ￿(￿)￿ speci￿cally, the urn-
ball function v ￿(1￿exp(￿u=v)), the telephone-line function (￿u+v)￿1 ￿￿u, ￿ 2 (0;1),
and the CES function (￿u￿ + v￿)￿1=￿ ￿ ￿1=￿uv, ￿ 2 (0;1) and ￿ > 0.2
When they meet, a worker and a ￿rm enter a bargaining game to determine the terms
of trade. In the ￿rst round, the worker advances a wage demand w1 to the ￿rm. If the
￿rm accepts w1; the negotiation comes to an end and production takes place. In this
case, the worker consumes w1 units of output and the ￿rm consumes y ￿ w1 units. If
the ￿rm rejects w1; the negotiation breaks down with probability 1￿exp(￿￿￿): In this
case, neither the worker nor the ￿rm consume anything. With probability exp(￿￿￿);
the negotiation continues with the ￿rm o⁄ering the wage w2 to the worker. If the worker
accepts w2; production takes place and the two parties consume respectively w2 and
y ￿ w2 units of the good. If the worker rejects w2; the negotiation breaks down with
probability 1 ￿ exp(￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿): With probability exp(￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿); the negotiation
continues to the next round where the worker gets to make a wage demand. The process
continues without a deadline. I will consider the limit outcome of the bargaining game as
￿ ! 0: The reader may ￿nd useful to interpret the parameter ￿ as the interval of time
between two consecutive wage demands of the worker. Following this interpretation, a
fraction ￿ of the interval is spent waiting for the ￿rm to make a countero⁄er. And a
fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of the interval is spent waiting for the worker to make his second wage
demand. Moreover, while waiting, there is an instantaneous break-down rate equal to 1.
2The urn-ball matching function owes its name to the fact that 1 ￿ exp(￿￿) is the probability that
an urn contains at least one ball if each of n￿ balls is randomly placed in one of n urns, n ! 1.
The telephone-line matching function owes its name to the fact that (￿￿ + 1)￿1 ￿ ￿￿ is the probability
that a ￿rm contacts a worker by dialing a number randomly selected from a phone book that lists a
measure ￿￿ of workers and a measure 1 of ￿rms. Notice that the telephone-line function satis￿es the
logical constraint m(u;v) ￿ minfu;vg if and only if ￿ 2 (0;1). Finally, the CES matching function owes
its name to fact that it features the constant elasticity of substitution (1 + ￿)￿1 between workers and
vacancies. Notice that the CES function satis￿es the logical constraint m(u;v) ￿ minfu;vg if and only
if the parameter ￿ is greater than 0 and ￿ is in the interval between 0 and 1.
52.2 Equilibrium
Let pk : [y;y] ! [0;1] be the probability that a ￿rm with productivity y posts the
message sk, where
P
sk2S pk(y) = 1. Let S be the set of messages that are posted by a
positive measure of ￿rms, i.e. S = fsk 2 S :
R
pk(y)dF(y) > 0g. Let gk : [y;y] ! R+
be the density of worker￿ s beliefs about the productivity of a ￿rm that has advertised
its vacancy with the message sk, where
R
gk(y)dF(y) = 1. Let ￿k;w : [y;y] ! R+ be the
worker￿ s expected payo⁄at the beginning of the bargaining game, given that the ￿rm has
posted the message sk and has a job with productivity y. Similarly, let ￿k;f : [y;y] ! R+
be the ￿rm￿ s expected payo⁄ at the beginning of the bargaining game, given that the
job has been advertised with sk and has productivity y.




(i) Pro￿t maximization: For all y 2 [y;y],
P
sk2S pk(y) = 1 and, whenever pk (y) > 0;
￿ (￿k)￿k;f (y) ￿ max
sj2S
￿ (￿j)￿j;f (y).
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(v) Perfection: For all sk 2 S, the payo⁄s ￿k;w (y) and ￿k;f (y) are derived from a
sequential equilibrium of the bargaining game between a worker with beliefs gk(y) and a
￿rm with productivity y. Moreover, the sequential equilibrium satis￿es the monotonicity
and stationarity conditions described in Section 3.1.
6(vi) Convexity of posting strategy: If pk(y1) and pk(y2) are strictly positive, then pk(y) >
0 for all y 2 [y1;y2].
Condition (i) guarantees that￿ given the queue lengths and bargaining outcomes
associated with each message￿ a ￿rm chooses its advertisement strategy to maximize
pro￿ts.3 Similarly, condition (ii) guarantees that￿ given queue lengths and bargaining
outcomes￿ a worker chooses where to apply for a job in order to maximize its expected
utility. Moreover, this condition implies that the queue of applicants ￿j that a ￿rm ex-
pects to attract by posting an o⁄-equilibrium message sj makes a worker indi⁄erent
between searching that ￿rm and searching elsewhere. Condition (iii) guarantees that￿
whenever possible￿ the worker￿ s posterior beliefs about the ￿rm￿ s productivity are de-
rived from Bayes￿law. Conditions (iv) and (v) are self-explanatory. Finally, condition (vi)
is a technical restriction on the equilibrium strategy which guarantees that the worker￿ s
posterior beliefs are well behaved.
Three normalizations can be adopted to eliminate duplications from the equilibrium
set. First, I can restrict attention to equilibria where every message posted by a positive
measure of ￿rms is associated with di⁄erent bargaining outcomes, i.e. if si and sj belong
to S then (￿i;w;￿i;f) 6= (￿j;w;￿j;f): In fact, if si and sj were associated to the same
outcome, there would be another equilibrium where only si is posted. Secondly, I can
restrict attention to equilibria where the messages posted in equilibrium are ordered
according to the worker￿ s expected bargaining payo⁄, i.e. if si and sj belong to S and i
is smaller than j, then
R
￿i;w (y)gi (y)dy is smaller or equal than
R
￿j;w (y)gj (y)dy. In
fact, one can always take an equilibrium and construct another one where si is relabeled
sj and viceversa. For this same reason, I can also restrict attention to equilibria where
only the ￿rst N message are used, where N = 1;2;:::K:
3 Conditions for an Equilibrium
3.1 Bargaining Outcome
Consider a ￿rm and a worker that have just entered the bargaining stage of the game.
The ￿rm has a job with productivity y and has advertised it with the message sk 2 S.
The worker￿ s beliefs about the productivity of the job are given by the density function
3Condition (i) also rules out equilibria in which some messages are posted by a set of ￿rms with mea-
sure zero. From the analysis of the necessary and su¢ cient condition for the existence of an equilibrium
carried out in Section 3, it follows that this restriction is made without loss in generality.
7gk(y). Condition (vi) in the de￿nition of an equilibrium guarantees that gk(y) is strictly
positive over some connected interval [yk;yk] ￿ [y;y].
As shown by Grossman and Perry (1986), any sequential equilibrium of this bargain-
ing game has the following recursive structure. The worker advances a wage demand
wt: If the job￿ s productivity is su¢ ciently high, the demand is met and the game ends.
If y is su¢ ciently low, the ￿rm rejects wt and makes an unacceptable countero⁄er (say
wt+1 = 0). If y takes on an intermediate value, the ￿rm rejects wt and counters with
an o⁄er that the worker is willing to accept. Together with a monotonicity condition
on out-of-equilibrium conjectures, this structure implies that a ￿rm can always signal
that the job has relatively low productivity by delaying the agreement. In particular,
by refusing to trade at the equilibrium wage w(y), a ￿rm y 2 [yk;yk] can convince the
worker that the productivity of its job lies somewhere between yk and y. Using this
observation, one can prove that w(y) cannot be greater than the wage outcome of the
perfect information bargaining game between the worker and a ￿rm with productivity
y. Also, one can prove that w(y) cannot be smaller than the outcome of the perfect
information game between the worker and a ￿rm with productivity yk.
A more precise characterization of the bargaining outcomes can be obtained by re-
stricting attention to sequential equilibria where the ￿rm￿ s strategy is stationary￿ in the
sense that history matters only through its e⁄ect on worker￿ s beliefs￿ and monotonic￿
in the sense that the possibility of additional high productivity ￿rms doesn￿ t lead a low
productivity ￿rm to lower the acceptance wage. Given these conditions, Gul and Son-
nenschein (1988) prove that￿ as the delay between o⁄ers converges to zero￿ all types in
the interval [yk;yk] trade instantaneously at the wage wk. Given the bounds on w(y),
it follows that wk is equal to the wage outcome of the perfect information game be-
tween the worker and a ￿rm with the lowest productivity on the support of gk(y), i.e.
wk = ￿yk: Also, one can prove that, when a ￿rm with productivity y = 2 [yk;yk] enters
the negotiation, the outcome of the bargaining game is immediate agreement at the wage
wk if y > ￿yk and no trade if y < ￿yk.
From this characterization of the bargaining outcome, I derive the expected bargain-
ing payo⁄s.
Proposition 1: (Bargaining Payo⁄s) As ￿ ! 0; for any sequence of equilibria satisfying
8the monotonicity and stationary conditions, the limits of the expected payo⁄s are
Z y
y
￿k;w (y)dGk (y) = ￿yk ￿ wk,
￿k;f (y) = maxfy ￿ ￿yk;0g
Proof: See Menzio (2005). k
3.2 Conditions for the Existence of an N-message Equilibrium
Let fpk;gk;￿k;w;￿k;f;￿kgK
k=1 be an equilibrium where the set S has cardinality N. In
this equilibrium, the messages posted by a positive measure of ￿rms are fs1;s2;:::sNg.
Each one of these messages is associated with a di⁄erent bargaining outcome. And
the higher is the message, the higher is the worker￿ s expected payo⁄ at the bargaining
stage. Given the characterization result in proposition 1, these conditions imply that
w1 < w2 < :::wN.
Conjecture that the equilibrium is such that every message sk 2 S attracts a strictly
positive queue of applicants. When this is the case, the optimal application condition
implies that a worker expects the same utility U from seeking any two jobs. When
the worker seeks a job advertised with a low message, he expects to be hired with high
probability (because the queue of applicants is short) and to receive a low wage. When
the worker seeks a job advertised with a high message, he expects to be hired with
low probability (because the queue of applicants is long) and to receive a high wage.
Formally, the equilibrium queue lenghts f￿kgN
k=1 are such that






The function w(￿;U) returns the wage that a worker must expect to receive in order
to be willing to apply for a job where the queue has length ￿. I am going to refer to
w(￿;U) as the ￿rm￿ s labor supply curve.4
In equilibrium, the productivity distribution of jobs advertised with the message sk
is related to the worker￿ s expectations about the outcome of the bargaining game. In
4From the properties of the job-￿nding probability ￿￿1￿(￿), it follows immediately that the labor
supply curve is strictly increasing, w(0;U) = ￿￿1U and w(1;U) = 1.
9particular, the expected wage wk is equal to a fraction ￿ of the productivity yk of the
lowest type of job that is advertised as sk, i.e.
yk = y (￿k;U) for all sk 2 S,
y (￿;U) = ￿
￿1w(￿;U).
(2)
The function y(￿;U) returns the productivity of the lowest type of job advertised with
a message that attracts a queue of applicants with length ￿.
In equilibrium, a ￿rm with productivity yk advertises its vacancy with the message
sk. From the pro￿t maximization condition, it follows that the bene￿t from posting sk
rather than sk￿1￿ namely [￿(￿k) ￿ ￿(￿k￿1)]￿yk￿ is greater or equal to the cost of doing
so￿ namely ￿(￿k)￿wk ￿￿(￿k￿1)￿wk￿1. Since the bene￿t of posting the higher message
is increasing in the ￿rm￿ s type while the cost is independent, all ￿rms with productivity
above yk strictly prefer sk to sk￿1: On the other hand, since yk <yk+1< :::yN; none
of the ￿rms with productivity below yk posts sk or any higher message. By combining
these two observations for k = 2, one can conclude that a ￿rm advertises its vacancy
with the message s1 if and only if the productivity falls in the interval (y1;y2). Then, by
iterating the argument, one can prove that a ￿rm posts sk if and only if its productivity
falls in the interval (yk;yk+1). Obviously, the type yk is indi⁄erent between advertising
with the message sk and sk￿1. Using equations (1) and (2), this indi⁄erence condition
can be expressed as
￿(￿k+1;￿k;U) = 0 for k = 1;2;:::N ￿ 1,
￿(￿k+1;￿k;U) = ￿ (￿k+1)(1 ￿ ￿)y (￿k+1;U) ￿ ￿ (￿k)[y (￿k+1;U) ￿ w(￿k;U)].
(3)
In equilibrium, the market for applicants must clear. For k = 1;2;:::N ￿ 1, the
total number of applications received by the ￿rms posting the message sk is equal to
￿k￿[F(yk+1) ￿F(yk)]. And the total number of applications received by the ￿rms posting
the most optimistic message sN is equal to ￿N ￿ [1 ￿F(yN)]. On the other hand, the
total number of applicants in the economy is equal to b. Therefore, the market-clearing




￿k [F (y (￿k+1;U)) ￿ F (y (￿k;U))] + ￿N [1 ￿ F (y (￿N;U))]. (4)
Conditions (3) and (4) are necessary for the existence of an N-message equilibrium.
It turns out that they are also su¢ cient. To see why, suppose that f￿kgN
k=1 is a strictly
10increasing sequence of queue lengths and U is a value of search such that (3) and (4)
are satis￿ed and y (￿1;U) = y. Then, consider a putative equilibrium where all ￿rms
with productivity in the interval between y (￿k;U) and y (￿k+1;U) post the message sk,
attract ￿k applicants and expect the bargaining payo⁄ maxfy ￿ w(￿k;U);0g. Workers
believe that the message sk 2 S is sent by the ￿rms with productivity in the interval
(y (￿k;U);y (￿k+1;U)) and expect the bargaining payo⁄ w(￿k;U). In addition, o⁄-
equilibrium messages are believed to originate from the same set of ￿rms that posts the
message s1, they are expected to attract a queue of length ￿1 and to lead to the wage
w(￿1;U).
Condition (3) implies that a ￿rm with productivity y(￿k+1;U) is indi⁄erent between
posting the message sk and sk+1. Since ￿k+1 > ￿k, condition (3) also implies that
all ￿rms with productivity higher than y(￿k+1;U) prefer sk+1 to sk and all ￿rms with
productivity lower than y(￿k+1;U) prefer sk to sk+1. Combining these observations for
k = 1;2;:::N ￿ 1, one can conclude that all ￿rms in the interval (y (￿k;U);y (￿k+1;U))
prefer sk to any other message. Therefore, the putative equilibrium satis￿es the ￿rst
condition in de￿nition 1. Similarly, one can verify that the putative equilibrium satis￿es
all the remaining conditions listed in de￿nition 1.5
In the following proposition, I vindicate the conjecture that all messages sk 2 S
attract a strictly positive queue of applicants. Then, I ￿ll in the details to prove that
conditions (3) and (4) are necessary and su¢ cient.
Proposition 2: (Necessary and Su¢ cient Conditions for an Equilibrium) (i) In any N
-message equilibrium, all messages attract some applicants and all ￿rms make strictly
positive pro￿ts. (ii) An N-message equilibrium exists if and only if there exists a strictly
increasing sequence of queue lengths f￿kg
N
k=1 and a value of U such that conditions (3)
and (4) are satis￿ed and y (￿1;U) = y.
Proof: In the Appendix. k
5At this point, the reader may have realized that any tuple fpk;gk;￿k;w;￿k;f;￿kgK
k=1 which satis￿es
conditions (i)￿ (iv) in the de￿nition of an equilibrium and such that E[￿w;k(y)] = wk; ￿k;f (y) = maxfy￿
wk;0g also satis￿es condition (vi). This property does not imply that condition (vi) can be removed
from de￿nition 1. In fact, without condition (vi), the density of the worker￿ s posterior beliefs gk(y) may
not satisfy the regularity conditions required to directly apply proposition 1 and to establish that the
outcome of any sequential equilibrium of the bargaining game is such that E[￿w;k(y)] = wk; ￿k;f (y) =
maxfy ￿ wk;0g.
114 Cheap Talk in Partial Equilibrium
In order to characterize the equilibria of the model economy, I proceed in two steps.
First, I construct the equilibrium set of the cheap-talk game between ￿rms and workers
for an exogenously given value of search U: Mathematically, this means ￿nding the given
lengths f￿kgN
k=1 that satisfy the indi⁄erence conditions (3) and the boundary condition
y(￿1;U) = y for a given U; U 2 (0;￿￿1￿y):6 In the second step, I recognize that the
amount of information transmitted through the cheap talk a⁄ects the value of search and
I endogenize U. Mathematically, this means ￿nding the equilibria (f￿kgN
k=1;U) of the
cheap-talk game that satisfy the market-clearing condition (4). In this section, I carry
out the ￿rst part of this procedure.
4.1 How to Construct the Equilibrium Set
For a given value of search U; U 2 (0;￿￿1￿y); let f￿kgN
k=1 be an N-message equi-
librium of the cheap-talk game between ￿rms and workers, i.e. f￿kgN
k=1 is a strictly
increasing sequence that sati￿es the indi⁄erence condition (3) and the boundary condi-
tion y(￿1;U) = y: In this equilibrium, all ￿rms with productivity between y(￿k;U) and
y(￿k+1;U) post the message sk, attract a queue of applicants of length ￿k and pay the
wage w(￿k;U). Firms with productivity higher than y(￿N;U) post the most optimistic
message sN, attract ￿N applicants and pay the wage w(￿N;U).
For this equilibrium, consider the following thought experiment. Of all the ￿rms
that advertise with the message sN, which ones would be willing to publicly disclose
the productivity of their vacancies if they were given the opportunity of doing so? If
a ￿rm has a vacancy with productivity y(￿;U) and discloses this information to the
public, it attracts a queue of applicants of length ￿, it ￿lls the vacancy with probability
￿ (￿) and it pays the wage ￿y(￿;U): The ￿rm￿ s expected pro￿ts are ￿(￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿
y(￿;U). If, on the other hand, the ￿rm posts the message sN, its expected pro￿ts are
￿(￿N) ￿ [y(￿;U) ￿ w(￿N;U)]: The payo⁄ di⁄erential between these two alternatives is













6In any equilibrium, a job advertised with the message s1 attracts a strictly positive queue of appli-
cants ￿1 and pays the wage ￿y. In any equilibrium, a worker expects utility U from seeking such a job.
Combining these two observations, one can conclude that the value of search U is greater than zero and
smaller than ￿￿1￿y.
12Suppose that there is a ￿rm that owns a vacancy with productivity y(￿N+1;U) greater
than y(￿N;U) and is indi⁄erent between disclosing its private information and posting
the messages sN. Then, f￿kgN
k=1 [ ￿N+1 is an (N + 1)-message equilibrium of the
cheap talk between ￿rms and workers. In this equilibrium, all ￿rms with productivity
lower than y(￿N+1;U) post the same message, attract the same queue and pay the
same wage as in the original N-message equilibrium. Firms with productivity higher
than y(￿N+1;U) post the message sN+1, attract ￿N+1 applicants and pay the wage
w(￿N+1;U):
Next, suppose that all the ￿rms that own a vacancy with productivity y(￿N+1;U)
strictly greater than y(￿N;U) prefer posting the message sN rather than disclosing their
private information. Then, there is no ￿N+1 > ￿N such that f￿kgN
k=1 [ ￿N+1 is an
(N + 1)-message equilibrium of the cheap talk. Indeed, if workers were to believe that
the message sN+1 comes from the set of types (y(￿N+1;U);y), the expected wage would
be ￿y(￿N+1;U) and there would be some ￿rms with productivity higher than y(￿N+1;U)
that strictly prefer sN to sN+1. Now, suppose that all the ￿rms that own a vacancy with
productivity y(￿N+1;U) strictly greater than y(￿N;U) prefer disclosing their private
information to the public. Also in this case, there is no ￿N+1 > ￿N such that f￿kgN
k=1 [
￿N+1 is an (N + 1)-message equilibrium of the cheap talk. Indeed, if workers were to
believe that the message sN+1 comes from the set (y(￿N+1;U);y), the expected wage
would be ￿y(￿N+1;U) and there would be some ￿rms with the productivity lower than
y(￿N+1;U) that strictly prefer sN+1 to sN. Finally, if there are no N-message equilibria
for which one can ￿nd a type that is indi⁄erent between two alternatives, then there are
no equilibria where N + 1 or more messages are used.
The previous discussion suggests a recursive approach to the characterization of the
equilibrium set. Denote with Z(￿) the set of zeroes of the function ￿(￿
0;￿;U) with the
property that ￿
0 > ￿. The unique 1-message equilibrium of the cheap talk is the queue
length ￿1 such that y(￿1;U) = y: The set of (N + 1)-message equilibria of the cheap
talk is given by all the sequences of queue lengths f￿kg
N+1
k=1 such that: (i) f￿kgN
k=1 is an
N-message equilibrium and (ii) ￿N+1 belongs to Z(￿N).
4.2 Firm￿ s Preference Ordering
In this subsection, I characterize the ￿rm￿ s preference ordering over revealing its pro-
ductivity y to the public and advertising its vacancy with the message sN for all y 2
(y(￿N;U);y). Then, I derive the properties of the set Z(￿N).
13When the productivity y is close to the boundaries of the interval (y(￿N;U);y), the
￿rm￿ s preference ordering is determined by the ￿rst derivative of the pro￿t di⁄erential











Since ￿(￿N;￿N;U) = 0 and ￿0(￿N;￿N;U) = ￿(￿N) ￿ ￿, the least productive ￿rms
in the interval (y (￿N;U);y) strictly prefer disclosing their private information when
￿(￿N) is greater than ￿. Conversely, when ￿(￿N) is greater than ￿; the least productive
￿rms strictly prefer advertising their vacancies with sN: These ￿ndings have a clear
economic intuition. For a ￿rm with productivity slightly higher than y(￿N;U), the pro￿t-
maximizing wage is greater than the wage associated with the message sN if and only if
the elasticity ￿(￿N) of the job-￿lling probability is greater than the worker￿ s bargaining
power ￿: Hence, it is natural that such a ￿rm prefers to reveal its productivity￿ and,
consequently, pay a higher wage￿ if and only if ￿(￿N) is greater than ￿. It is useful to
denote with ￿L the solution to ￿(￿L) = ￿:
Since lim￿!1 ￿0 (￿;￿N;U) = 1￿￿￿￿ (￿N), the most productive ￿rms in the interval
(y(￿N;U);y) strictly prefer disclosing their private information to the public when ￿ is
smaller than 1￿￿(￿N): Conversely, when ￿ is greater than 1￿￿(￿N); the most productive
￿rms strictly prefer advertising their vacancies with sN. These ￿ndings are easy to
understand because￿ for a very productive ￿rm￿ the increase in revenues obtained from
revealing its type is approximately equal to (1 ￿ ￿(￿N)) ￿ y; while the increase in the
wage bill is approximately equal to ￿y: It is useful to denote with ￿R the solution to the
equation 1 ￿ ￿(￿R) = ￿:
The direction in which the ￿rms￿preference ordering varies as the productivity y is
raised from y(￿N;U) to y is determined by the second derivative of the pro￿t di⁄erential














When the pro￿t di⁄erential is concave, more productive ￿rms have a stronger preference
for advertising their vacancy with the message sN. That is, if ￿(￿;￿N;U) is negative
for some ￿ > ￿N, all ￿rms with productivity higher than y(￿;U) strictly prefer posting
sN. And if ￿(￿;￿N;U) is positive for some ￿ > ￿N, all ￿rms with productivity lower
than y(￿;U) strictly prefer revealing their type.7 Conversely, when the pro￿t di⁄erential
7These properties are easily derived. Since the function ￿(￿;￿N;U) is concave, the set of ￿ ￿￿ s such
that ￿ ￿ ￿N and ￿(￿;￿N;U) ￿ 0 is convex. Since ￿(￿N;￿N;U) is equal to zero, the set includes the
point ￿N. Therefore, the function ￿(￿;￿N;U) is positive on a connected interval [￿N; ^ ￿].
14is convex, more productive ￿rms have a stronger preference for publishing their private
information. In line with basic economic intuition, equation (7) tells us that higher types
have a stronger preference for sN when the labor supply curve is convex, i.e. when it
takes a higher and higher wage to attract one more applicant to the ￿rm. In addition,
equation (7) reminds us that the convexity of the labor supply curve is equivalent to the
convexity of the inverse of the job-￿nding probability.
In light of these ￿ndings, I can characterize the set Z(￿N): First, consider the case of
a matching function with the property that the inverse of the job-￿nding probability is
convex. If the queue of applicants attracted by the message sN is greater than ￿L, the set
Z(￿N) is empty. In fact, the least productive ￿rms in the interval (y(￿N;U);y) strictly
prefer posting sN than disclosing their private information because ￿(￿N) is smaller than
￿: And all the other ￿rms in the interval (y(￿N;U);y) rank the two alternatives in the
same way because￿ when ￿(￿)￿1￿ is convex￿ more productive ￿rms have a stronger
preference for sN: The set Z(￿N) is empty also when ￿N is smaller than ￿R: In fact,
the most productive ￿rms strictly prefer disclosing their private information rather than
posting sN because 1 ￿ ￿(￿N) is greater than ￿: And all the other ￿rms in the interval
(y(￿N;U);y) rank the two alternatives in the same way because of the convexity of
￿(￿)￿1￿. Finally, if ￿N lies between ￿R and ￿L, the set Z(￿N) contains the point z(￿N).
All the ￿rms with productivity higher than y(z(￿N);U) strictly prefer sN. All the ￿rms
with productivity between y(￿N;U) and y(z(￿N);U) strictly prefer disclosing their type.
And the ￿rms that own a vacancy with productivity y(z(￿N);U) are indi⁄erent between
the two alternatives.
Next, consider the case of a matching function with the property that the inverse
of the job-￿nding probability is concave. If ￿N is smaller than ￿L, the set Z(￿N) is
empty because all the ￿rms in the interval (y (￿N;U);y) strictly prefer revealing the
productivity of their vacancy to the public. If ￿N is greater than ￿R, Z(￿N) is empty
because all these ￿rms strictly prefer to advertise their vacancies with sN. Finally, if
￿N takes on intermediate values, the ￿rms with productivity y(z(￿N);U) are indi⁄erent
between the two alternatives. A complete characterization of the zeroes of the pro￿t
di⁄erential function is contained in the following lemma and illustrated in Figure 1:
Lemma 1: (Firm￿ s Preference Ordering) Denote with ￿L the solution to ￿(￿L) = ￿.
Denote with ￿R the solution to 1 ￿ ￿ (￿R) = ￿:
(i) If ￿(￿)￿1￿ is convex, ￿R is smaller than ￿L: For all ￿N = 2 (￿R;￿L), the correspon-
dence Z(￿N) is empty. For all ￿N 2 (￿R;￿L), Z (￿N) is a decreasing function z (￿N)
such that lim￿N!￿R z(￿N) = 1 and lim￿N!￿L z(￿N) = ￿N.
15(ii) If ￿(￿)￿1￿ is concave, ￿L is smaller than ￿R. For all ￿N = 2 (￿L;￿R), Z (￿N) is
empty. For all ￿N 2 (￿L;￿R); Z (￿N) is a function z (￿N) such that lim￿N!￿L z(￿N) =
￿L and lim￿N!￿R z(￿N) = 1. Moreover, z (￿N) ￿ ￿N is strictly increasing.
Proof: In the Appendix. k
4.3 Equilibrium Set
Now, I am in the position to characterize the equilibrium set of the cheap-talk game
between workers and ￿rms for a given value of search U: First, suppose that the matching
function is such that the inverse of the job-￿nding probability is convex. For all U 2
(0;￿￿1￿y), there exists a unique 1-message equilibrium. In this equilibrium, every ￿rm￿ s
type posts the message s1 and attracts a queue of applicants with length ￿1, where ￿1
satis￿es the boundary condition y(￿1;U) = y. If ￿1 is greater than ￿R and smaller
than ￿L, there exists a unique 2-message equilibrium as well. In this equilibrium, a ￿rm
posts the message s1 if its productivity is lower than y(z(￿1);U) and posts the message
s2 otherwise. The more optimistic announcement attracts a queue of applicants with
length z(￿1). Since z(￿1) is greater than ￿L, there are no equilibria of the cheap-talk
game involving three or more messages. This impossibility result has a clear economic
intuition. When ￿(￿)￿1￿ is convex, a 3-message equilibrium can only exist if￿ for a
￿rm with productivity slightly above y(￿2;U)￿ the pro￿t-maximizing wage is higher
than ￿y(￿2;U). On the other hand, a ￿rm with productivity slightly below y(￿2;U)
must prefer to advertise its vacancy with s1 rather than s2. For this to be true, the
￿rm￿ s pro￿t-maximizing wage must be lower than ￿y(￿2;U). The two conditions are not
compatible.
Next, suppose that the matching function is such that the inverse of the job-￿nding
probability is concave. For all U 2 (0;￿￿1￿y), there exists a unique 1-message equi-
librium of the cheap-talk game. In this equilibrium, all ￿rms post s1 and attract ￿1
applicants, where y(￿1;U) = y. If ￿1 is greater than ￿L and smaller than ￿R, there ex-
ists a unique 2-message equilibrium as well. In this equilibrium, ￿rms with productivity
lower than y(z(￿1);U) post the message s1 and attract ￿1 applicants to their vacancies.
More productive ￿rms post s2 and attract z(￿1)applicants. This exhausts the equi-
librium set if z(￿1) is greater than ￿R or, equivalently, if ￿1 is greater than z￿1(￿R).
Otherwise, there exists a unique 3-message equilibrium as well. More generally, if ￿1
is greater than ￿L and smaller than (z￿1)T(￿R), there exists a unique (T + 2)-message
equilibrium. Notice that, as T ! 1, (z￿1)T(￿R) converges monotonically to ￿L.
16Proposition 3: (Cheap Talk in Partial Equilibrium). For a given U 2 (0;￿￿1￿y)
denote with ￿1 the solution to the boundary condition y (￿1;U) = y.
(i) Suppose ￿(￿)￿1￿ is convex. Then, there exists a unique 1-message equilibrium. In
addition, if and only if ￿1 2 (￿R;￿L);there exists a unique 2-message equilibrium. There
are no equilibria with 3 or more messages.
(ii) Suppose ￿(￿)￿1￿ is concave. Then there exists a unique 1￿message equilibrium.
In addition, if and only if ￿1 2 (￿L;(z￿1)T(￿R)); there exists a unique N-message
equilibrium for N = 2;3;:::T + 2:
5 Cheap Talk in General Equilibrium
In the previous section, I have constructed the set of equilibria of the cheap-talk game
between ￿rms and workers for an exogenously given U; U 2 (0;￿￿1￿y): In this section,
I use the market-clearing condition (4) to endogenize the value of search:
First, I derive a general expression for the aggregate demand of applicants. Suppose
that￿ for a certain value of U in the interval (0;￿￿1￿y)￿ there exists an N-message
equilibrium of the cheap talk. In such an equilibrium, a continuum of ￿rms with measure
F (y (z (￿1);U)) advertise their vacancies with the message s1 and ￿demand￿a queue of
applicants with length ￿1, where ￿1 is such that y (￿1;U) = y: In such an equilibrium,













message sk+1 and demands a queue of applicants with length zk (￿1); k = 1;2:::N ￿ 2:







optimistic message sN and demand zN￿1 (￿1) applicants. Overall, in such an equilibrium,
the aggregate demand of applicants is given by
bd (￿1;N) =
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where the boundary condition y(￿1;U) = y implicitly de￿nes U as a function of ￿1.
Now, suppose that the matching function is such that inverse of the job-￿nding
probability is convex. For all positive values of ￿1, there is a unique 1-message equilibrium
of the cheap talk between ￿rms and workers. In this equilibrium, the aggregate demand
of applicants bd(￿1;1) is equal to ￿1. For all values of ￿1 in the interval between ￿R and
￿L, there is a unique 2-message equilibrium as well. In this equilibrium, every ￿rm with
17productivity lower than y(z(￿1)U) demands the same number of applicants as in the 1-
message equilibrium. And every ￿rm with productivity higher than y(z(￿1);U) demands
strictly more applicants. Therefore the aggregate demand bd(￿1;2) is strictly greater than
bd(￿1;1): Over the interval (￿R;￿L); bd(￿1;2) is a continuous function which, locally, may
be increasing or decreasing depending on the shape of the distribution function F(y).
For ￿1 ! ￿R, the fraction of ￿rms posting the message s2 becomes smaller and smaller
and the queue of applicants demanded by each of them grows larger and larger. As
long as the tail of the distribution F(y) is not too thick,8 the aggregate demand for
applicants converges to bd(￿1;1). For ￿1 ! ￿L, the informative content of the messages
s1 and s2 becomes more and more similar and bd(￿1;2) converges to bd(￿1;1). Figure
2(a) illustrates the properties of the aggregate demand correspondence when ￿(￿)￿1￿ is
convex.
Next, suppose that the matching function is such that the inverse of the job-￿nding
probability is concave. For all positive values of ￿1, there is a unique 1-message equilib-
rium of the cheap talk. In this equilibrium, the aggregate demand of applicants bd(￿1;1)
is equal to ￿1. For all values of ￿1 in the interval between ￿L and (z￿1)N￿2(￿R), there
is a unique N-message equilibrium as well. In this equilibrium, every ￿rm with pro-
ductivity lower than y(zN￿1(￿1);U) demands the same queue of applicants as in the
(N ￿ 1)-message equilibrium associated with ￿1. Every ￿rm with productivity higher
than y(zN￿1(￿1);U) demands strictly more applicants. Therefore, the aggregate demand
for applicants bd(￿1;N) is strictly greater than bd(￿1;N ￿ 1). For ￿1 ! ￿L, bd(￿1;N)
converges to bd(￿1;1) because the informative content of the messages s2;s3;:::sN be-
comes more and more similar to s1: For ￿1 ! (z￿1)N￿2(￿R); bd(￿1;N) converges to
bd(￿1;N ￿1) because fewer and fewer ￿rms post the most optimistic message sN. Figure
2(b) illustrates the properties of the aggregate demand correspondence when ￿(￿)￿1￿ is
concave.
Since a general equilibrium in which ￿rms advertise their vacancies with N informa-
tionally di⁄erent messages is a point where the aggregate supply curve b intersects the
aggregate demand of applicants bd(￿1;N); the next theorem follows immediately from
the previous characterization of bd:
Theorem 1: (Partially Directed Search). Let b denote the in￿mum of bd (￿1;N) for all
￿ > 0 and N ￿ 2. Let b denote the supremum of bd (￿1;N) for all ￿ > 0 and N ￿ 2.
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Theorem 1 is the paper￿ s main result. It states that￿ as long as b lies in the interval
(b;b)￿ there exists an equilibrium where the inherently uninformative messages used by
￿rms to advertise their job openings partially direct the search strategy of workers. In
such an equilibrium ￿rms use N ￿ 2 di⁄erent messages to advertise jobs with di⁄erent
productivity. Workers apply more frequently for jobs that are advertised with higher
messages, i.e. messages that are believed to originate from a more productive set of
￿rms. And the outcome of the bargaining game between a ￿rm and a worker is a wage
that is higher the higher the message posted by the ￿rm. If, instead, b is greater than b or
smaller than b, the unique equilibrium features random search. In this equilibrium, ￿rms
use informationally equivalent messages to advertise jobs with di⁄erent productivity.
Workers ignore these messages and apply with the same probability to all vacancies.
And the outcome of the bargaining game between a worker and a ￿rm is independent
from the message that was posted by the ￿rm. Finally, theorem 1 relates the cuto⁄ b
and b to the fundamentals of the economy. In particular, it states that the interval (b;b)
contains the set of worker-to-￿rm ratios b such that ￿L ￿ b and ￿R ￿ b have opposite
signs or, equivalently, such that (￿(b) ￿ ￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿(b) ￿ ￿) < 0:
From a qualitative point of view, the main implication of theorem 1 is that￿ even
though in reality most help-wanted ads contain only vague and non-contractual an-
nouncements about compensation￿ one should not conclude that the search process is
random. In fact, these announcements may be informative about the job￿ s quality, they
may a⁄ect the worker￿ s and ￿rm￿ s bargaining strategies and, in turn, they may be cor-
related with actual wages. From a quantitative point of view, the main implication of
theorem 1 is suggesting a procedure to test whether non-contractual announcements can
partially direct the workers￿search strategy in a particular labor market. Speci￿cally,
using data on the duration of vacancies, the number of applications, the hiring wages
and on labor productivity, it is possible to recover the deep parameters of the model and
compute the cuto⁄s b and b. Then, using data on the unemployment and the vacancy
rate, it is possible to verify whether b belongs to the interval (b;b).
Perhaps, the reader is concerned about the signi￿cance of these ￿ndings given that
theorem 1 restricts attention to the family of matching functions with the property
19that the inverse of the job-￿nding probability is either globally convex or concave. Two
remarks are in order. First, most standard matching functions belong to this family. For
example, the urn-ball function is such that ￿(￿)￿1￿ is globally convex. And the CES
function is such that ￿(￿)￿1￿ is globally concave when the parameter ￿ is smaller than
1 and convex when ￿ is greater than 1. Secondly, even though this restriction a⁄ords a
sharper characterization of the equilibrium set, it is not necessary for the existence of a
partially directed search equilibrium. For example, the reader can easily verify that￿ as
long as ￿(b)￿￿ and 1￿￿(b)￿￿ have opposite signs￿ there exists a distribution function
F(y) that sustains an informative equilibrium of the cheap talk.9
6 Conclusions
This paper has shown that ostensibly uninformative statements about compensation￿
such as those one typically ￿nds in help-wanted ads￿ can be correlated with actual
wages and partially direct the search strategy of workers. Intuitively, workers apply
more frequently to those jobs that are advertised with more positive messages because
they expect to meet more productive ￿rms that, in turn, are more likely to concede to
high wage demands. In turn, more positive messages are posted by more productive
￿rms because those are the only ones that are willing to face tougher wage demands at
the bargaining stage in order to ￿ll their openings with higher probability.
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2: (i) The optimal application condition implies that higher
messages attract longer queues of applicants. The market-clearing condition implies that
some of the messages attract a strictly positive queue of applicants. Combining these
two observations, we can conclude that in any equilibrium there is a message sl 2 S such
that ￿k = 0 if k < l and ￿k > 0 if k ￿ l. Also, the characterization of the bargaining
game implies that the lowest type of ￿rm posting the message sk 2 S has productivity
yk = ￿
￿1wk. Since fwkgN
k=1 is a strictly increasing sequence, so is fykgN
k=1. Hence, in
equilibrium, no ￿rms with productivity lower than yk posts sk or any higher message.
Suppose that l is strictly greater than 1. All ￿rms with productivity y in the interval
between y1 and yk advertise their vacancies with sl￿1 or a lower message. In equilibrium,
all these ￿rms make zero pro￿ts. In particular, a ￿rm with productivity y 2 (￿yk;yk)
21makes zero pro￿ts. If, deviating from the equilibrium, this ￿rm was to post the message
sk, its expected pro￿ts would be ￿(￿k) ￿ (y ￿ ￿yk) > 0. A contradiction. Therefore, it
must be the case that l is equal to 1, i.e. ￿1 > 0. In turn, this implies that all ￿rms
make strictly positive pro￿ts in equilibrium.
(ii) The necessity of conditions (3) and (4) has been proved in the main text. The
su¢ ciency of conditions (3) and (4) is proved by direct veri￿cation of the equilibrium
conditions (i)￿ (vi). k
Proof of Lemma 1: (i) Suppose that ￿(￿)￿1￿ is convex. From (5); it follows that
￿(￿N;￿N;U) is equal to zero. From (7) it follows that ￿(￿;￿N;U) is a strictly concave
function of ￿.
For all ￿N ￿ ￿L, the elasticity of the matching function ￿(￿N) is greater than the
worker￿ s bargaining power ￿. This implies that the derivative of the pro￿t di⁄erential
is negative when evaluated at ￿ = ￿N, i.e. ￿0 (￿N;￿N;U) ￿ 0. Using the fact that
￿(￿N;￿N;U) = 0 and ￿00 (￿;￿N;U) < 0, one concludes that ￿(￿;￿N;U) is strictly
negative for all ￿ > ￿N. The correspondence Z (￿N) is empty.
For all ￿N ￿ ￿R, the worker￿ s bargaining power ￿ is smaller than 1￿￿(￿N). This implies
that the derivative of the pro￿t di⁄erential is positive when evaluated at ￿ = 1. Using
the fact that ￿(￿N;￿N;U) = 0 and ￿00 (￿;￿N;U) < 0, one concludes that ￿(￿;￿N;U)
is strictly positive for all ￿ > ￿N. The correspondence Z (￿N) is empty.
Temporarily, suppose that ￿L is smaller than ￿R. Then, for all ￿N 2 (￿R;￿L); the
derivative of the pro￿t di⁄erential is negative when evaluated at ￿ = ￿N and positive
when evaluated at ￿ = 1. Because this contradicts the fact that ￿(￿;￿N;U) is a
concave function, one concludes that ￿R is smaller than ￿L.
For all ￿N 2 (￿R;￿L); the derivative of the pro￿t di⁄erential ￿ with respect to ￿ is
strictly positive when evaluated at ￿N and strictly negative when evaluated at 1: Using
the fact that ￿(￿N;￿N;U) = 0 and ￿00 (￿;￿N;U) < 0, one concludes that the pro￿t
di⁄erential is strictly positive for all ￿ 2 (￿N;z (￿N)) and is strictly negative for all
￿ > z (￿N). The correspondence Z (￿N) contains z (￿N) only.
By construction, the expression￿(z(￿N);￿N;U) is equal to zero for all ￿N 2 (￿R;￿L).






















The ￿rst term in curly brackets is the derivative of the pro￿t di⁄erential with respect
to ￿ evaluated at ￿ = z(￿N). Therefore, this term is strictly negative. The second
22term in curly brackets is strictly negative because ￿(￿N) is strictly greater than ￿
and the job ￿nding probability ￿
￿1￿(￿) is decreasing in ￿. Therefore, the function
z (￿N) is strictly decreasing over its domain (￿R;￿L). Moreover, it is easy to verify that
lim￿N!￿R z(￿N) = 1 and lim￿N!￿L z(￿N) = ￿N.
(ii) The analysis of the case in which the labor supply curve is convex is similar and is
omitted for the sake of brevity. All details are available upon request. k
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